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Low Riding
Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000), affd,
2000 WL 1013583 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 2000) (order granting motion for
summary affirmance).
Jackson and his co-plaintiffs were members of avowed religious faiths
that forbade adult men to cut their hair or shave their beards.' They sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the defendants-the District of
Columbia, the Director of D.C. Corrections, and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons-from subjecting them (or anyone else) to a grooming policy.' The
plaintiffs asserted that the grooming policy, which prohibited beards and
dreadlocks and required inmates to keep their head hair shorter than one
inch in length,' violated their rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act' and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.5
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 6 arguing in part that the plaintiffs
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal
court, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).7 The
plaintiffs responded, in part, that because pursuit of administrative remedies
would have been futile, they need not have exhausted such remedies before
the commencement of federal litigation.' The court agreed that exhaustion
of remedies "would be futile, in the sense that plaintiffs would not have
1. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48, 65 (D.D.C. 2000).
2. Id. at 50.
3. Id.
4. 42 U.sC. § 2000bb (1994). The Jackson court assumed that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act still applies to the federal government notwithstanding the holding of Boerne v.
City of Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 50 n.70.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1231-66 (1996).
8. Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (" [Pllaintiffs have argued that the court should find their
exhaustion obviated by its futility in this case.").
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secured a religious exemption to the grooming policy even if they had
strictly complied with Virginia Corrections' inmate-grievance protocol." 9
Still, the D.C. district court granted the defendants' motion, ruling in
part that there was no futility exception in the PLRA. l° The court
concentrated on the legislative history of the PLRA, which was adopted by
Congress in 1996," and concluded that Congress intended no futility
exception.'" In Jackson and similar cases, government defendants have
argued that "the legislative evolution [of the PLRA] irrefutably establishes
that Congress intended exhaustion to be mandatory regardless of the
effectiveness of the available administrative process." 1"
This Case Note argues that courts cannot make sense of Congress's
intent when substantive legislation is adopted by appropriations rider. The
legislative history of the PLRA, a prime example of a piece of substantive
legislation passed as a rider, is too clouded for a court to determine easily
what Congress intended concerning exhaustion and futility. Moreover, the
bill to which the PLRA was attached was the final compromise in an
unprecedented budget battle, a battle in which, for the first time in recent
American history, partisan rancor led the federal government to shut its
doors. The Republican Party, widely viewed as the obstinate participant in
that budget dispute, faced strong political pressure to pass the bill at all
costs, even if specific provisions did not reflect congressional intent. Based
on the lack of clear legislative intent and the context of government
shutdowns, the Supreme Court should declare a new principle of statutory
interpretation based on the central lesson of Jackson: that, in the nascent era
of government shutdowns, appropriations riders should be narrowly
construed in order to avoid misinterpreting congressional intent. 4
I
A number of circuit courts across the country have wrestled with the
issue of exhaustion under the PLRA and have reached varying
9. Id. at 61.
10. Id.
11. Id. (identifying "legislative intent as the lynchpin to all exhaustion determinations").
12. Id. (" [T]o apply [a futility] exception[] ... would ... flout Congress' intent.").
13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Garcia v. Jones, 208 F.3d 221 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 440 (2000) (No. 99-1730). In Jackson, the court found that "[t]he legislative
history of the PLRA supports the court's reading of Section 1997e(a)." Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at
62.
14. This Case Note does not take a position on the underlying merits of prisoner litigation and
the PLRA. Arguably, the federal docket is clogged with such litigation and the PLRA was a
much-needed reform. It is possible to argue that the manner in which the PLRA was adopted was
suspect without questioning the constitutionality of, or necessity for, a free-standing PLRA
(adopted as a bill independent of the appropriations process).
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conclusions."5 To answer the question of whether Congress intended a
futility exception when it adopted the PLRA, the Jackson court looked at
two pieces of evidence. First, the court noted that the words "plain, speedy,
and effective" were deleted by the PLRA. 16 Second, the court quoted at
length the statement of a single legislator, Representative Lobiondo,"7 to
15. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir.) (exhaustion required), cert. granted,
121 S. Ct. 377 (2000); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 65 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the futility
exception did not survive the passage of the PLRA); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532,
538 (7th Cir. 1999) (exhaustion required); Werdell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)
(exhaustion required); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (exhaustion
required); Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 885-87 (5th Cir. 1998) (exhaustion required); Jenkins v.
Morton, 148 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required); Garret v. Hawk, 127 F.3d
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1997) (exhaustion required).
The dispute in Jackson and these cases originated, of course, in Congress's adoption of the
PLRA in 1996. The PLRA was approved by the House as part of H.R. 3019 on March 11, 1996,
and signed into law by the President on April 26, 1996. It first began to take shape more than a
year before that, as part of H.R. 3, introduced by Representative McCollum on January 4, 1995.
The PLRA was later incorporated into H.R. 554 (introduced on January 18, 1995), H.R. 667
(introduced on January 25, 1995, and adopted by the House on February 10, 1995), H.R. 695
(introduced on January 26, 1995), H.R. 2076, S. 400 (introduced on February 14, 1995), S. 1594
(introduced on March 6, 1994), S. 866 (introduced on May 25, 1995), S. 1275 (introduced on
September 26, 1995; this version included most of the PLRA provisions but did not alter the
preexisting exhaustion language), S. 1279 (introduced on September 27, 1995), and S. 1495
(introduced on December 21, 1995). While all of these bills included the same basic reforms,
there was an important change (for the purposes of this case) between S. 866 and S. 1279. Prior to
and including S. 866, the bills did not delete the language "plain, speedy, and effective" from
§ 1997e. Beginning with S. 1279, those qualifiers were deleted. S. 1275, which fell between S.
866 and S. 1279, did not address the exhaustion provision of § 1997e in any way.
As amended by section 803(d) of the PLRA, the United States Code reads in relevant part:
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West
Supp. 2000).
Prior to the adoption of the PLRA, § 1997e read in relevant part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section
1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would
be appropriate and in the interests of justice, continue such case for a period of not to
exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective
remedies as are available.
(2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not be required
unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such
administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable
standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are otherwise fair and
effective.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994).
16. Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (' [Tihe court assumes this change to the statute's wording
was made for a reason. Here, the reason is fairly clear: Congress did not want the federal courts to
sit as a super-department of corrections and review the effectiveness of prison administrative
remedies or the speed with which they lead to a final resolution." (footnote omitted)).
17. Representative Lobiondo stated: "The new administrative exhaustion language in H.R.
2076 will require that all cases brought by Federal inmates contesting any aspect of their
incarceration be submitted to administrative remedy process before proceeding to court."
Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (emphasis in court's opinion) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H 14078-02,
H14105 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995)).
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support its argument that Congress intended exhaustion to be a mandatory
requirement lacking a futility exception.' 8
The court read far too much into the deletion of the "plain, speedy, and
effective" language and Representative Lobiondo's statement. That
Lobiondo was unopposed on the floor of Congress might suggest that his
statement captures Congress's intent. 9 The fact is, Congress did not get the
chance to consider thoroughly the PLRA, Lobiondo's statement, or the
deletion of the words "plain, speedy, and effective" because the bill was
included as a rider on an appropriations bill (initially attached to H.R. 2076,
then to H.R. 3019, both omnibus budget bills). Several legislators pointed
this out during the floor debates on H.R. 2076, an appropriations bill to
which Congress attached the PLRA (President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2076 on
December 25, 1995).2' Academic commentators have also noted the
abbreviated nature of legislative debate on the PLRA.2' In the context of the
18. Generally speaking, the views of the authors, sponsors, or supporters of a bill should not
be used to determine congressional intent. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.12 (6th ed. 2000). Courts could appropriately make an
exception to the general rule that the floor statements of a bill's authors or sponsors should not be
viewed as conclusive of congressional intent if those views are clearly communicated to the
legislative body. See id. § 48.12. Such an exception is not warranted in this case. Representative
Lobiondo made his statement during a wide-ranging debate on a comprehensive budget bill. See
infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. Moreover, Lobiondo spoke with regard to H.R. 2076,
which was vetoed, not H.R. 3019, which became law. The relevant text of the two bills was
identical, but it is unlikely that when voting on H.R. 3019 in the spring of 1996, legislators
recalled a single statement that Representative Lobiondo had made during the previous December
with regard to a different bill.
19. Indeed, in other related cases the government has made such an argument. See Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Garcia v. Jones, 208 F.3d 221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 440
(2000) (No. 99-1730) (arguing that Representative Lobiondo's statement indicates congressional
intent because it was the "single" statement on the issue and because it was "unopposed").
20. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H14078-02, H14106 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Conyers) ("This conference report improperly includes substantive legislative provisions
regarding prison litigation reform.... None of these provisions belong in an appropriations bill.
These are matters clearly within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee and I am distressed
that the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction has been subverted in this way."). During the Senate
debates on H.R. 3019, Senator Kennedy expressed the following view:
[T]he effort to enact this proposal as part of omnibus appropriations bill [wa]s
inappropriate. Although a version of the PLRA was introduced as a free-standing bill
and referred to the Judiciary Committee, it was never the subject of a committee
mark-up, and there is no Judiciary Committee report explaining the proposal. The
PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type
of thorough review that a measure of this scope deserves.
142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
21. See, e.g., Eugene Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Inmate Litigation,
Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 375 n.79
(1998) (" [T]he PLRA was not subject to very intense scrutiny or debate in Congress."). Professor
Herman of the Brooklyn Law School argued:
The legislative process leading to the passage of the PLRA was characterized by ... [a]
lack of any real debate.... Its provisions, which amend a number of different sections
of the United States Code, bear many signs of... haste .... Even the title could have




rushed passage of one bill, and the lack of debate, the single statement of an
individual legislator should not control the interpretation of the statute. In
addition to not debating the PLRA in detail, legislators may not even have
noticed its provisions, hidden as they were in a very large, omnibus bill.
Congress debated a variety of issues in considering the appropriations bill
to which the PLRA was attached, and legislators had much to address
besides the PLRA's exhaustion language.22
II
The traditional rule of statutory interpretation would not call upon a
court to view the PLRA differently because it was passed as an
appropriations rider.23 This rule may have been appropriate in the past, but
two major changes in the nature of the legislative process now caution
against retaining this approach. The first is the proliferation of substantive
riders on appropriations bills.24 In the past, legislators added riders to
appropriations bills, but by and large these riders concentrated on the
appropriations process itself or, at the very least, were "limitations
riders," 25 which affected substantive policy by setting a limit on how much
could be spent. The PLRA, in contrast, was divorced from appropriations.26
Nor is the PLRA alone in this respect: The last half-century has seen an
explosion of substantive law passed through appropriations riders.27
The second important development that suggests the old rule of
statutory interpretation may need modification is that America has entered
an unprecedented era of government shutdowns. The political climate of
1996-when the PLRA was adopted-may explain why Congress failed to
Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in
Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REv. 1229, 1277 (1998) (citations omitted).
22. Cf Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations
Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 457, 476 (1997) (discussing how, after
substantive environmental law was changed by a rider to an appropriations bill, "many members
were surprised to discover the actual impact of the rider").
23. See, e.g., Bowles v. Sunshine Packing Corp., 5 F.R.D. 282, 286 (W.D. Pa. 1946) ("It has
been well established that provisions of substantive law may be amended or suspended by riders
in an Appropriation Act, and that the regularly constituted Federal Courts will interpret such
riders.").
24. See Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress
To Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 458-62 (1992)
(describing the history and growth of the use of appropriations riders); Zellmer, supra note 22, at
457 ("The technique of appending substantive provisions to appropriations bills has become a
favorite tool of the legislative trade in recent years." ).
25. LeBoeuf, supra note 24, at 460 ("Throughout history Congress has used limitation riders
to advance a bewildering array of policy objectives.").
26. Id. at 457.
27. Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L.J. 456, 460-63; LeBoeuf, supra note 24, at 460 (noting that 341 riders were proposed
between 1963 and 1977).
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consider the bill thoroughly. Congress passed the PLRA as part of the
omnibus budget bill that finally resolved the historic government-shutdown
crisis of the winter of 1995-1996.2s Congress faced strong political pressure
to pass the budget package at all costs,2 9 even if the riders attached to the
bill did not clearly express or even reflect congressional intent.
When legislators vote on appropriations bills, particularly in the high-
stakes government-shutdown political game, they no doubt do so for many
reasons other than the intention to amend substantive law. All legislative
votes potentially arise from compromise rather than reasoned consideration
of a vote's policy merits. Yet in the case of riders, as Jackson shows, the
odds are so high that votes do not indicate true legislative intent as to justify
a new rule that substantive riders to appropriations bills should be narrowly
construed so as to minimize their impact on preexisting law.3"
III
While other commentators have called for modifications of existing
judicial deference to appropriations riders,3' this Case Note provides a more
pressing argument for such modification. Amending environmental laws by
rider poses policy problems,3" but because of its First Amendment and civil
rights implications, the enactment of the PLRA by rider is far more serious.
In other PLRA cases, prisoners have made allegations that, if true, would
raise serious civil rights concerns: for example, that they were kicked, spit
on, beaten, and called various epithets.33 The difference between making a
28. See Statement by President William J. Clinton on Signing H.R. 3019, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 726 (Apr. 26, 1996) ("Rather than move quickly to reach a compromise such as the
one achieved with this legislation, the Congress shut the government down twice and then I had to
sign a record thirteen continuing resolutions funding the government.").
29. As one pundit explained, "Newt and his allies made a number of miscalculations....
They misjudged the public's reaction to the shutdown: it redounded against the recalcitrant
Republicans, not the reasonable sounding fellow in the White House." Richard Stengel, What
Clinton Is Doing Right, TIME, Feb. 5, 1996, at 28. For an exceptional account of the high-stakes
budget crisis of the winter of 1995-1996, consult DICK MORRIS, BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE:
WINNING THE PRESIDENCY IN THE NINETIES 158-89 (1997). As Morris explained, "The budget
battle left the Republican party humiliated and drastically weakened." Id. at 188. While Congress
has not forced a government shutdown since, the threat of another government shutdown is
realistic, and that threat has effects that reverberate into the tail end of every appropriations
process. Fearful of the political effects of another shutdown, legislators may vote for omnibus
bills without giving any consideration to the inclusion of substantive riders.
30. LeBoeuf, supra note 24, at 474 (" [Slubstantive policy changes contained in
appropriations riders are objectionable because they often don't receive adequate
consideration.... Riders are usually introduced during floor debate on the bill in question, and
voted on at a time when few if any [legislators] have given them the attention appropriate to
questions of policy.").
31. E.g., Zellmer, supra note 22. Because environmental problems are so complex,
considering them in committee may be especially important (perhaps more important than a cut-
and-dried civil rights issue). Id. at 505..
32. For a discussion of these problems, see id.
33. See, e.g., Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
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mistake interpreting an environmental statute and making a mistake
interpreting a statute with religious or civil rights implications has to do
with the respective effects on the political power of the party disadvantaged
by a court's holding. If a court wrongly interprets legislative intent with
respect to an environmental matter for, say, the benefit of the polluter, that
does not affect the political clout of conservationists, who can return to the
legislature and demand clarification of legislative intent.34 In contrast, an
adverse judgment against a civil rights plaintiff might have lasting
psychological and political consequences. If a court errs on the side of
undermining a civil right, then the aggrieved party's ability to use civic
action to seek legislative clarification may be undermined.
The Supreme Court should reject the traditional rule implicitly followed
by the Jackson court. Instead, courts should narrowly construe the changes
in prior law wrought by the PLRA, and, because the statute is not entirely
unambiguous on its face, hold that the futility exception survived its
passage. For caution's sake, a wise beginning would limit this new
approach to cases in which federal civil rights laws are affected. Ideally,
such a modification would begin to curb the excessive use of riders by
Congress, and foster a more deliberative and considered democracy. 35
Nevertheless, there are no obvious legal principles or constitutional or
statutory provisions3 6 on which a court could base such a change in
approach to substantive legislation enacted by appropriations rider. While
the PLRA's substantive appropriations riders violated the House and Senate
rules in effect at the time the PLRA was enacted,37 violations of such rules
are not legally actionable." It is within the power of the judiciary, however,
to set its own rules of statutory interpretation. Refusing to interpret riders
expansively does not make a substantive statement about any particular
law. Indeed, it would violate the principle of separation of powers if
Congress were to claim the right to prohibit courts from determining how to
interpret legislation.39
34. Indeed, an adverse finding might increase the clout of conservationists by giving them a
rallying cry to raise more money from donors.
35. Professor Michael Rappaport has argued that the "modem tactic of legislating by massive
Continuing Resolutions... makes a travesty of the ideal of a deliberative Congress." Michael B.
Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REv. 735, 743 n.21 (1993).
36. See LeBoeuf, supra note 24, at 462 (" [Tihere is no... specific constitutional stricture
regarding limitation riders on [appropriations] bills.").
37. See Zellmer, supra note 22, at 506.
38. See id. at 516 ("[T]here is no independent mechanism to enforce the rules of Congress;
members are left to comply voluntarily.").
39. One might also fear that the courts' narrow construction of riders would violate
separation-of-powers principles. But courts would not be mandating particular behavior by
Congress. Rather, courts would be articulating a rule to guide their own interpretation of statutes.
At most, courts would be establishing a background rule under which Congress would operate;
background rules have a long history in statutory interpretation. Congress can deal with issues it
really wants to by regular law, even if riders are disfavored. Moreover, appropriations riders pose
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Are there dangers in asking courts to interpret narrowly substantive
legislation passed by rider? One problem is that, while most rider-enacted
legislation has come into effect rather recently, some substantive riders
were enacted more than a few years ago. Private parties may have
contracted based on existing court interpretations of such legislation, and
the rule called for in this Case Note could create instability and economic
damage by upsetting existing relations. All that would be needed to remedy
such problems would be for Congress to reenact such legislation in a free-
standing fashion." Moreover, not all riders would be interpreted differently,
since the proposed reform requires litigation in federal court.41 Finally,
these transition costs are short-term costs, and over the long run, the gains
in judicial efficiency (as courts more consistently adjudicate statutes that
are far clearer than those enacted by rider) will make up for the costs
associated with reinterpreting a number of laws in a short time.
While the PLRA may have been a necessary and appropriate legislative
enactment, the manner in which it was enacted leaves unresolved questions
about whether it accurately reflects congressional intent. Because the
elimination of the futility exception potentially implicates substantive civil
rights laws, courts should narrowly construe the PLRA's modification of
existing law. Broad construction of such riders may have been appropriate
before the threat of government shutdowns raised the political stakes of the
appropriations process. In the modem political landscape, that is no longer
the case. It is not too much to ask the national legislature to follow its own
rules and enact substantive law only through full and formal legislative
processes.
-Geoffrey Christopher Rapp
their own separation-of-powers problems, see LeBoeuf, supra note 24 (arguing that some
appropriations riders undermine the executive and foreign-relations prerogatives of the President),
the reduction of which could outweigh any damage brought about by reform.
40. Of course, the balance of power in today's Congress may differ from that in a Congress
that enacted a particular piece of legislation. Thus, it might be difficult to replicate perfectly a
statutory regime enacted in the past.
41. If legislation adopted by rider makes all affected parties perfectly happy, no one will
challenge it and therefore no court will strike it down. Only where the rights of a party are
significantly affected can one expect litigation.
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